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8 Abstract Compulsory voting is an underexposed factor of the electoral system that
9 possibly inﬂuences women’s descriptive representation. Studlar and McAllister (Eur
10 J Polit Res 41(2):233–253, 2002) found a negative effect, but no theoretical
11 explanations were given. We develop two possible explanations: voters who only
12 vote because they have to are less politically sophisticated, and therefore vote less
13 sophisticatedly, and/or they have different attitudes about women in political life.
14 From our study, we are able to detect a gendered effect of compulsory voting in
15 Belgium’s ﬂexible-list PR system, but only the vote sophistication explanation is
16 conﬁrmed. Voters who would no longer vote without compulsory voting signiﬁ-
17 cantly vote more for top candidates (mostly men) and give signiﬁcantly less pref-
18 erence votes for candidates lower down the list. This points us to the complexity of
19 the ballot structure as an important new dimension that could help explain gendered
20 voting effects of compulsory voting systems. Finally, since different effects for
21 formal and descriptive representation appear, we posit that compulsory voting
22 constitutes a dilemma for women activists.
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29 Introduction
30 A vast literature (Caul 1999; Duverger 1955; Krook and Schwindt-Bayer 2013;
31 Studlar and McAllister 2002) has emphasised the importance of institutional factors
32 (and electoral institutions in particular) as intervening variables for explaining the
33 (descriptive) representation of women in parliaments. In this article, we will focus
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34 on one speciﬁc underexposed institutional variable that is part of the electoral
35 system: the provision of compulsory voting. By doing so, we provide a signiﬁcant
36 contribution to the existing literature on electoral systems and the factors that shape
37 women’s representation.
38 While it could be argued that this provision is beneﬁcial for the formal
39 representation of socially disadvantaged groups (including women), its effect on the
40 descriptive representation of women remains underexposed. In a cross-country
41 analysis on the macro level, Studlar and McAllister (2002) found a negative effect
42 of compulsory voting on women’s descriptive representation, but no theoretical
43 explanations for this ﬁnding were given. Here, we will conduct an in-depth analysis
44 of Belgium, one of the approximately thirty countries worldwide using compulsory
45 voting. By conducting a study based on survey data at the individual level, we
46 provide more insight in the underlying mechanisms of the gendered effects of
47 compulsory voting. It will be investigated whether voters who would no longer vote
48 if compulsory voting were to be lifted are less likely to vote for women, and how
49 this can be explained. A crucial intervening variable is political sophistication. Less
50 sophisticated voters are less likely to vote when compulsory voting is lifted. We test
51 two hypotheses about voters who would abstain from voting if it was not
52 compulsory (and who are accordingly less politically sophisticated): they cast a less
53 sophisticated vote and have different attitudes about women’s role in political life.
54 We ﬁnd that people who vote only because of compulsory voting provisions are
55 less likely to vote for women, and this is mainly because they cast less sophisticated
56 votes. As such, it seems that compulsory voting per se is not detrimental for voting
57 for women—as was found by Studlar and McAllister (2002)—but, as we
58 hypothesise, that the gendered effect of compulsory voting is conditional upon
59 the complexity of the electoral system.
60 Electoral institutions
61 Electoral institutions are ‘‘the formal and informal rules governing the electoral
62 process’’ (Krook and Schwindt-Bayer 2013). Three formal elements of electoral
63 institutions that are important for women’s representation will be discussed brieﬂy:
64 the electoral formula, the district magnitude and the ballot structure. Most attention
65 will be devoted to the ballot structure, since we believe that this plays an important
66 role in explaining the gendered effect of compulsory voting (cfr. infra).
67 There is a general consensus (Caul 1999; Duverger 1955; Rule 1987; Studlar and
68 McAllister 2002) that the list variant of proportional representation (PR), in which
69 seats are allocated among lists of candidates in accordance to their respective share
70 of the vote, is more propitious for the nomination and election of women than the
71 plurality/majority rule. PR systems perform better because of their higher district
72 magnitudes, i.e. the number of seats elected in a district (Duverger 1955; Matland
73 2005; Rule 1987), and because of parties’ different electoral strategies (Krook and
74 Schwindt-Bayer 2013; Matland 2005). PR-system lists should reﬂect the social
75 diversity in the electorate (Matland 2005), whereas in majoritarian systems, the
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76 party candidate is supposed to represent the district population as a whole and
77 mainly territorial interests are pursued (Krook and Schwindt-Bayer 2013).
78 Also, ballot structure is an important element of electoral institutions (Krook and
79 Schwindt-Bayer 2013). Duverger (1955) already suggested that female candidates
80 may be more successful under electoral rules that give voters less choice. Since the
81 mid-1990s and the introduction of quota systems, the view that closed lists (in
82 which seats are allocated to the candidates according to their order on the list) are
83 more advantageous for the election of women has become the most common
84 perspective (Caul 1999; Rule 1987; Schmidt 2009; Wauters et al. 2010).
85 There is yet another element related to the ballot structure that is relevant for our
86 purposes, i.e. the complexity of casting a vote. Gallego (2010) demonstrated that in
87 systems with many different choices to be made (open-list or ﬂexible-list PR
88 systems), citizens with lower levels of political interest tend to abstain more than in
89 ‘easy’ systems (majority systems or closed-list PR systems) in which only one
90 choice out of a limited number of options has to be made. Voters who are not
91 politically sophisticated appear to prefer simple choices over more complex choices,
92 as the latter require more knowledge and effort. We will come back to this later.
93 In sum, research on the effects of electoral rules has focused on broad distinctions
94 between PR and majoritarian systems, and has examined nuances in district
95 magnitude and ballot structure. Other parts of electoral institutions, such as
96 compulsory voting, have been underexposed, however (Krook and Schwindt-Bayer
97 2013).
98 Compulsory voting
99 Most democratic governments consider participating in national elections a right of
100 citizenship. In some countries, this is considered a civic responsibility, or even a
101 duty. In these countries, voting has been made compulsory. Approximately thirty
102 countries in the world have regulations that make voting compulsory (Gratschew
103 2004). Most of them are in Latin America or Western Europe, but there are also a
104 few cases in Asia (IDEA 2015). Even when compulsory voting is not strictly
105 enforced, it at least increases social pressure to go to the polls (Gallego 2010).
106 Studies of compulsory voting have focused on the kinds of voters that would
107 otherwise abstain (Gallego 2010; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998; Kittilson 2005;
108 Lijphart 1997; Singh 2015), on the effects on the relative strength of parties
109 (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Brunell and DiNardo 2004; Caluwaerts and
110 Reuchamps 2015; Quintelier et al. 2011) and on the effects on the correspondence
111 between voters’ policy preferences and party choice (Selb and Lachat 2009).
112 However, it remains unclear which gender effects are linked to compulsory voting,
113 especially for descriptive representation.
114 As for the formal dimension of representation (i.e. the possibility to select a
115 representative), low voter turnout is usually associated with patterns of inequality
116 (Verba et al. 1995). In countries without compulsory voting, more privileged
117 citizens (those with higher incomes and better education) exercise their right to vote
118 more often (Blais 2000; Carreras and I˙repog˘lu 2013; Gallego 2010; Lijphart 1997;
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119 So¨derlund et al. 2011). When it comes to gender and formal representation, results
120 are mixed. Kittilson (2005) and Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) argue that men are
121 more likely to participate in elections than women. De Winter and Ackaert (1998)
122 and Campbell (2006) indicate, however, that women do not show up less because of
123 their gender, but due to lower educational and professional status. This is conﬁrmed
124 by Reuchamps et al. (2015) in their study on the last Belgian elections.
125 Regarding the descriptive dimension of representation (i.e. the presence of
126 representatives), the number of studies is far more limited. In their comparative
127 analysis of women’s legislative representation in twenty industrialised democracies
128 since 1950, Studlar and McAllister (2002) indicate that there are two important
129 factors inﬂuencing the proportion of female representatives: the electoral system
130 and the level of turnout. They assert that turnout and voter registration are
131 differentially located among social groups because of differences in political interest
132 and political involvement, which could have an inﬂuence on women’s represen-
133 tation. Their reasoning is that the higher the turnout (either stimulated by
134 compulsory voting or not), the more diverse the voters (who are more likely to cast a
135 diverse vote), and the higher the share of elected women. Contrary to their
136 expectations, Studlar and McAllister (2002) found that compulsory voting had a
137 negative effect with each percentage increase in turnout reducing women’s
138 representation by 0.14%. Compulsory voting systems reduced women’s represen-
139 tation even by about 3.5%. The authors did not provide any explanation for this
140 unexpected outcome, however. It is our aim to search for these explanations and to
141 consider their actual role in inﬂuencing women’s descriptive representation. To that
142 end, we develop two theoretical explanations in the next section.
143 Explaining the effects of compulsory voting on descriptive
144 representation
145 We develop two hypotheses explaining why potential non-voters (i.e. people who
146 would no longer always vote when compulsory voting is lifted) vote signiﬁcantly
147 less for women. First, we believe that they cast less sophisticated votes and, second,
148 they could be less convinced about the importance of women’s political
149 participation. The general level of political sophistication of a voter is a crucial
150 intervening variable in both cases.
151 There is no direct relationship between compulsory voting and voting for women.
152 As indicated by Studlar and McAllister (2002) and illustrated in Fig. 1, this
153 relationship starts from political sophistication (which comprises political interest,
Voter 
sophiscaon 
(interest, 
knowledge, trust)
Parcipaon in elecons (1)
Sophiscated vote (2) 
Gender ideology (3)
Vong for women
Fig. 1 Causal relationship between participation in elections and voting for women
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154 political knowledge and political trust). Voters’ level of political sophistication
155 determines three factors: (1) participation in elections, (2) the sophistication of the
156 vote, and (3) the importance attached to women’s representation (gender ideology).
157 We hypothesise that a combination of factors 2 and 3 leads to potential non-voters
158 voting signiﬁcantly less for women.
159 First, both Reuchamps et al. (2015) and Selb and Lachat (2009) found a strong
160 link between political sophistication and potential absenteeism (1). Those who are
161 not interested in politics will not participate in elections. The provision of
162 compulsory voting, however, forces voters with low interest in politics to vote. This
163 could have several consequences on voting behaviour, and ﬁrst of all, in terms of
164 voter choice (2). The bulk of empirical research refutes the assertion that individuals
165 with low interest in politics will transform into informed and engaged citizens when
166 forced to vote (Fishkin 2009; Gordon and Segura 1997; Loewen et al. 2008; Selb
167 and Lachat 2009; Singh and Thornton 2013). In general, those voters tend to make
168 choices that are considerably less consistent with their policy preferences than
169 voluntary voters (Selb and Lachat 2009). The most extreme consequence is what
170 Reuchamps et al. (2015) and IDEA (2015) suggest: compulsory voting leads to
171 arbitrary votes, as it forces electors to cast any vote. Potential non-voters check off a
172 party or a candidate at random or cast invalid ballots (Hirczy 1994).
173 Consequences could also be subtler, in the sense that voters with low levels of
174 political sophistication will make less use of preferential voting (i.e. voting for
175 individual candidates instead of a party), when forced to vote in PR systems with
176 intra-party choices (open-list and ﬂexible-list systems). According to the resource
177 model (Marsh 1985), casting a preference vote is more demanding on the part of
178 voters, since it requires to learn about candidates and compare them (Shugart et al.
179 2005). Since potential non-voters are less politically sophisticated, they are less
180 likely to make the effort to cast a preference vote. Andre´ et al. (2012), using data
181 from the Belgian 2009 regional elections, indeed come to the conclusion that a
182 higher degree of political interest and resources is more likely to be translated into
183 candidate-based voting. Preferential voting in general, and speciﬁcally for women
184 (who often take positions lower down the list), can thus be considered as
185 sophisticated electoral behaviour that requires skills and attitudes (Marien et al.
186 2017). Above, we already discussed how complex ballot structures discourage
187 people with low levels of political sophistication.
188 Another aspect of the sophistication of the vote is that potential non-voters vote
189 more for established candidates and for incumbents, i.e. existing holders of a
190 political ofﬁce and heads of list. Both incumbents and candidates in prominent
191 positions on the ballot form automatically draw more votes, even when other factors
192 are controlled for (Maddens et al. 2006). This effect can be labelled the Ballot
193 Position Effect (Geys and Heyndels 2003; Lutz 2010; Maddens et al. 2006). Given
194 their historical underrepresentation and the use of selection criteria that are often
195 based on male norms (Kenny and Verge 2016), women are less numerous among
196 incumbents and candidates on top of the list. Owing to quota regulations taking into
197 account top-list positions, progress has recently been made in Belgium. At the most
198 recent elections of 2014, about 29% of all heads of lists were women (Smulders
199 et al. 2014).
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200 Research on incumbency voting has, however, demonstrated that sometimes the
201 opposite applies: the higher the turnout at elections, the higher the vote share for
202 challengers of incumbents (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Hansford and Gomez 2010;
203 O’Malley 2008). This also seems to apply for compulsory voting: Carreras (2012)
204 study on presidential elections in Latin America found that the score of outsider
205 candidates was about 8% higher in systems with compulsory voting. All these
206 studies, however, do not take into account the complexity of the electoral system
207 (and more in particular, the ballot structure). Most of them focus on the US and the
208 UK, whose majoritarian electoral systems ask the voters a simple and straightfor-
209 ward choice for one particular candidate out of a handful of candidates (Bernhagen
210 and Marsh 2007; Hansford and Gomez 2010; O’Malley 2008).
211 We hypothesise that in more complex electoral systems (PR systems with
212 preferential voting, alternative vote, etc.), which require more effort from the voters,
213 the anti-incumbency effect will be overtrumped by political sophistication. Casting
214 a vote for challengers (lower down the candidate list of a party) is a sophisticated
215 vote and supposes that a voter is informed about a large number of candidates, and
216 potential non-voters are not sufﬁciently interested in politics to make all these
217 efforts, we posit. Consequently, we expect that these potential non-voters will vote
218 more for established candidates who occupy top-list positions. It is in that respect
219 perhaps no coincidence that in the country sample of Studlar and McAllister (2002),
220 who found a negative gender voting effect of compulsory voting, only countries
221 with complex ballot structures were included (Belgium, Italy and Australia).
222 This leads to Hypothesis 1: potential non-voters cast less sophisticated votes
223 (more list and head-of-list voting), which is a disadvantage for women, because
224 often they are not at the top of the ballot.
225 Political interest and knowledge also impact on voters’ attitudes about the role of
226 women in political life (Bittner et al. 2010; Jennings 2006), which is also sometimes
227 called ‘gender ideology’ (3) (Erzeel and Caluwaerts 2015; Shvedova 2005) or
228 ‘gender role attitudes’ (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004). This concept refers to
229 opinions of individual voters about the role of men and women in society (Bittner
230 et al. 2010; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004). Interested and knowledgeable voters,
231 who have been intensively exposed to prominent female politicians and to
232 discussions about women’s political underrepresentation, are more likely to be in
233 favour of gender equality in the political sphere (Bittner et al. 2010).
234 Although clear progress has been made over time, not all voters are equally
235 convinced about the extent to which women should play a prominent role in politics
236 (Jennings 2006). Several factors can explain differences in gender role attitudes
237 between individuals (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Jennings 2006). (Jennings 2006)
238 exposure hypothesis posits that differences in the role conceptions about women in
239 politics could be explained by differences in exposure to practices of gender
240 equality and to discussions about political underrepresentation of women, which is
241 undoubtedly related to political sophistication. Exposure is, as Jennings notes,
242 driven by media content, social movements and interpersonal relations.
243 The limited number of studies that have focused on the link between ‘political
244 gender ideology’ and voting behaviour come to the conclusion that there is a
245 signiﬁcant effect from the former on the latter (Erzeel and Caluwaerts 2015;
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246 Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011). Voters more open to women taking up a
247 prominent political role are more likely to vote for women. This ﬁnding points us to
248 the importance of considering gender role attitudes in explaining voting behaviour
249 for women.
250 This leads to Hypothesis 2: potential non-voters are less politically sophisticated
251 and are consequently less open to women in politics. They are therefore less likely
252 to vote for women.
253 The two hypotheses together suggest that voters who are less politically
254 sophisticated have a higher chance to stay at home when compulsory voting is
255 lifted. Furthermore, as they tend to cast less sophisticated votes and be less open to
256 women in politics, they are less likely to vote for women. Therefore, when these
257 low-interest voters are forced to vote by the provision of compulsory voting, women
258 candidates will be worse off, we posit.
259 Research design and method
260 Belgium is one of the few countries in the world in which a generalised system of
261 compulsory voting exists. This is not strictly enforced: the chances that a non-voter
262 will have to appear before court are extremely small, as well as the possible ﬁnes
263 (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). The turnout level has, however, remained constant
264 throughout the years at a level of about 89%, which is far above the average number
265 of turnouts in other countries.
266 Belgium has a PR electoral system with ﬂexible lists: a voter has the choice
267 between casting a preferential vote for one or more candidates (on a single party
268 list) and casting a list vote. Candidates receiving sufﬁcient preferential votes to pass
269 the election threshold are automatically elected. The other candidates can reach the
270 threshold by making use of the list votes. These list votes are distributed to
271 candidates according to their order on the list, offering a substantial advantage to
272 candidates at the top of the list. Preference votes have a direct effect on descriptive
273 representation, as the number of candidates elected solely on the basis of their
274 preference votes have been increasing since the end of the 1990s (Put et al. 2014).
275 These votes also have an indirect effect in the sense that they are used as a criterion
276 for the selection of ministers and of candidates for the next elections (Andre´ et al.
277 2015).
278 Legislation concerning the presence of women on candidate lists has been
279 introduced in Belgium more than 20 years ago. In 1994, a ﬁrst quota law was
280 introduced, which stated that a maximum of two-thirds of the candidates on a list
281 could be of the same sex. In 2002, this was changed into the requirement of an equal
282 number of men and women on the list (with a maximum difference of one in case of
283 an odd number of candidates). In addition, one of the two highest positions on the
284 list is reserved for a women candidate. Non-compliance leads to rejection of the list
285 by the public authorities (Meier 2004). This quota legislation has led to a substantial
286 increase of women MPs (Wauters et al. 2014) and to a better representation of
287 women at the top of electoral lists (Smulders et al. 2014; Vandeleene 2014; Wauters
288 et al. 2014). Meier (2004) refers to a mutual contagion effect, stating that the
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289 parallel use of legal and party gender quotas created a dynamic which opened up the
290 political forum to women more than would have been the case if either party or legal
291 measures alone had been applied.
292 For our empirical analysis, we make use of data gathered by the PartiRep
293 Election Study, which is an electoral panel survey held before (pre-electoral wave)
294 and after (post-electoral wave) the European, federal and regional elections of 2014
295 in Belgium (see: www.partirep.eu). We focus in this paper on the federal (or
296 national) elections, which are generally perceived as the most important ones
297 (Dandoy et al. 2015).1 In the pre-electoral wave, based on a stratiﬁed sample of
298 eligible voters in two main Belgian regions (Flanders and Wallonia), face-to-face
299 CAPI2 interviews were conducted among 2019 respondents (response rate of 45%).3
300 The same respondents were contacted again for the post-electoral wave shortly after
301 Election Day in which telephone CATI4 interviews were used. This yielded 1532
302 respondents (response rate of 76%).5 Respondents were also asked to ﬁll in a self-
303 administered mock ballot6 on which they had to cast exactly the same (preference)
304 votes as on their real voting ballot. This innovative method was previously used in
305 the Irish National Election Studies (McElroy and Marsh 2009) and in a study on
306 Belgian local elections (Pilet et al. 2013).
307 Respondents were asked: ‘‘If voting was not compulsory in Belgium, would you
308 always, often, sometimes, or never vote in the Belgian federal elections?’’.7 These
1FL01 1 Owing to the intensive and time-consuming coding work of the mock ballot forms, it was only feasible
1FL02 to examine one kind of election.
2FL01 2 CAPI—computer-assisted personal interviewing—is an interview technique in which the respondent or
2FL02 interviewer uses a computer to answer the questions.
3FL01 3 A random sample was drawn from the National Register, including the inhabitants of Flanders and
3FL02 Wallonia (not the Brussels Region) who were eligible to vote in the elections of May 25, 2014, and were
3FL03 no more than 85 years old. Those who refused to participate are not arbitrarily spread: this often involves
3FL04 people in a precarious social situation, lower-skilled people or people who have little or no interest in
3FL05 society and politics. The sample is thus not perfectly representative. The sample was weighted to obtain a
3FL06 good representation of the population in terms of gender, age and level of education.
4FL01 4 CATI—computer-assisted telephone interviewing—is a telephone surveying technique in which the
4FL02 interviewer follows a script provided by a software application.
5FL01 5 All respondents who participated in the ﬁrst wave were invited to participate in the post-electoral wave.
5FL02 Also, here, the general disadvantage about the representativeness of the sample holds.
6FL01 6 A second wave of the survey was carried out immediately after the elections. With several elections in
6FL02 1 day, people tend to quickly forget which party they voted for and which candidates they cast a
6FL03 preference vote for. Therefore, a few days before the elections, all respondents received three booklets
6FL04 containing mock ballots for the lists and candidates in their district for the election of the European,
6FL05 Flemish or Walloon and federal parliament. Respondents were asked to record this vote immediately after
6FL06 casting their actual vote (for which lists and which candidates). After the elections, they were contacted
6FL07 by telephone (between May 26 and July 1, 2014). Based on the completed mock ballots, respondents
6FL08 could precisely tell what votes they cast. The information on the voting behaviour is thus very accurate.
7FL01 7 We are fully aware that there might be differences between reported voter turnout in surveys and actual
7FL02 turnout (Karp and Brockington 2005). These differences are caused by social desirable answers and
7FL03 memory failure. The latter is not a problem here as our central variable does not concern voting behaviour
7FL04 in the past, but prospective behaviour. As for the social desirability, there are mechanisms to increase
7FL05 reliability (Belli et al. 1999). It has been shown that the use of a scale with more than two dichotomous
7FL06 categories (yes or no) helps. This is exactly what we do here (by giving respondents the possibility to
7FL07 choose between always, often, sometimes and never).
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309 four different categories were recoded into two categories: always (1), and often,
310 sometimes or never (2). Here, we follow the same categorisation as Reuchamps
311 et al. (2015) (Table 1).
312 Results indicate that half of the respondents, 51%, say that they would no longer
313 vote. These respondents indicated that they would ‘often’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’
314 vote. Thus, some of them would still vote, just not always. For the sake of clarity
315 regarding our terminology: we will call those who will always vote ‘voters’, while
316 the others will be labelled ‘non-voters’ or ‘potential non-voters’. Nevertheless,
317 where enough observations are available for reliable statistical analyses, we also
318 present the results of the variable with 4 categories.
319 Belgium’s ﬂexible-list PR system gives voters the choice to cast none, one or
320 multiple preference votes on candidates of one or both sexes within one party list
321 (see also Marien et al. 2017). Given that the ﬁrst position on the list is a highly
322 visible position, it is interesting to distinguish between casting one preference vote
323 on the ﬁrst candidate of the list and casting a preference vote for another candidate
324 lower down the list. These options result in a variable with seven categories: voting
325 for women only, including (1) casting one preference vote on the ﬁrst candidate on
326 the list, (2) voting for one woman who is not the ﬁrst candidate on the list, (3) voting
327 for multiple women and voting for men only, including (4) casting one preference
328 vote on the ﬁrst candidate on the list, (5) voting for one man who is not the ﬁrst
329 candidate on the list, (6) voting for multiple men, and ﬁnally (7) voting for both men
330 and women. This allows us to sketch a rich and multi-faceted picture of voting for
331 women in Belgium, taking into account the complexity of this voting behaviour. We
332 do not have a direct measurement of incumbency, but this is to a large extent
333 captured by analysing the head of list, since about 70% of them are incumbents (Put
334 et al. 2014).
335 The attitude about women’s role in political life was measured by two items in
336 the questionnaire on which respondents could strongly agree, agree, agree nor
337 disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree. The ﬁrst item was about an equal division
338 of political responsibilities between men and women, the second about the need to
339 have an equal number of men and women represented in parliament.8
Table 1 Answers on the question whether respondent would still vote when compulsory voting would be
abolished (N = 1628)
Type Answer N %
Voter Always 796 48.9
Non-voter Often 224 13.8
Sometimes 182 11.2
Never 425 26.1
8FL01 8 Other gender-related items were included in the questionnaire, but as they mainly concerned the
8FL02 appropriateness of the use of instruments to overcome underrepresentation (such as quota, penalties for
8FL03 parties or companies, and gender neutral education), they are not used in this analysis.
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340 We operationalise political sophistication by three variables: political interest (on
341 a scale from 0 to 10), political knowledge (score on ﬁve questions to test political
342 knowledge) and political trust (trust in the national parliament on a scale from 0 to
343 10).
344 Results
345 This section is divided into two parts: in the ﬁrst part, we describe the differences in
346 voting for women between voters and non-voters. In the second part, we will test the
347 two hypotheses by looking at the sophistication of voting behaviour and support for
348 women’s political role.
349 Descriptive part
350 Two ﬁndings immediately become obvious when looking at the differences in the
351 voting behaviour of voters and non-voters (Table 2). First, there are signiﬁcantly
352 more list voters among potential non-voters compared to voters: 57 versus 47% (and
353 this difference is found for all categories of non-voters). As list votes are transferred
354 according to the list order and women only take 29% of top positions on the list
355 (Smulders et al. 2014), a high share of list votes is adverse for women candidates.
356 Second, the percentage of voters casting at least one vote for a woman candidate
357 is higher among voters than among non-voters (and this gap is also found when we
358 separately consider people who would often, sometimes or never vote). Although
359 voters have ample opportunity to vote for women (as the number of women
360 candidates equals that of men due to quota regulations), 26% of the voters and only
361 16% of the non-voters do so. This allows us to conclude that non-voters vote less
362 often for women than voters. In other words, compulsory voting has a negative
363 effect on the descriptive representation of women. This means that female
364 politicians would have a greater vote share when the votes of potential non-voters
365 would not be taken into account, which is in line with the results of Studlar and
366 McAllister (2002).
367 Explanatory part
368 We developed two hypotheses for why non-voters vote signiﬁcantly less for women:
369 potential non-voters cast less sophisticated votes (by following the lists presented by
370 party elites) (H1) and are less convinced of the quality of women in politics (H2).
371 For the ﬁrst explanation, we already demonstrated in Table 2 that non-voters
372 generally prefer list voting over preference voting. Now, we will investigate the
373 kind of preference vote more in detail. In particular, we look at whether a vote was
374 cast for the candidate at the top of the ballot, for another candidate on the list or for
375 more than one candidate on the list, and in addition, whether a candidate’s gender
376 makes a difference in these kinds of votes. In this case, we decided to restrict our
377 analysis to the dichotomy between voters and non-voters. The number of
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378 observations is too small per category for the full range categorisation, which would
379 hinder reliable analyses.
380 The results in Table 3 (ﬁrst three columns) indicate that there are signiﬁcant
381 differences between voters and non-voters regarding voting for the head of list and
382 voting for multiple candidates. This is a clear conﬁrmation of the ‘less sophisticated
383 vote’ hypothesis (H1). Votes that suggest more in-depth knowledge about
384 candidates, such as voting for several candidates, are less often cast by non-voters:
385 28% versus 43% for people who would always vote. Conversely, non-voters vote
386 more often for a head of list (47% versus 32% for voters). For this kind of vote,
387 limited political knowledge (about a handful party ﬁgureheads) sufﬁces.
Table 2 Kind of vote for voters and (several types of) non-voters (list vote versus preference vote)
List
vote
Preference
vote
For at least
one women
For no
women
Unknown
Voter/always (N = 613) 47.6 52.4 25.9 23.3 3.1
Non-voter (N = 531) 57.3 42.8 16.4 22.6 3.8
v
2 *** **
Often (N = 168) 56.5 43.5 22.6 17.9 3.0
Sometimes (N = 124) 59.7 40.3 14.5 25.0 0.8
Never (N = 239) 56.5 43.5 12.6 24.7 6.2
v
2 ** **
For these respondents, we only know that they have casted one or more preferential votes, but not for
which candidate(s)
* p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.001
Table 3 Kind of preference vote for voters (N = 321) and non-voters (N = 227) (only those who cast a
preference vote)
Voted for… Voter Non-
voter
Voted for… Voter Non-
voter
% % % %
Only head of list*** 32.5 47.3 1 woman as head of list (ns) 6.0 9.7
1 man as head of list** 26.5 37.9
One candidate lower on list (ns) 24.5 23.7 1 woman lower on list (ns) 13.6 9.7
1 man lower on list (ns) 11.4 14.1
Several candidates*** 43.0 28.2 Several women (ns) 5.3 2.9
Several men* 9.9 5.3
Several men and women* 27.8 20.3
Although it would be interesting to make a distinction by party preference, we only look at the distri-
bution of votes in general. Owing to the existence of two separate party systems in Belgium (in Flanders
and Wallonia) and to the high number of parties due to the PR system, the number of observations by
party are too small to conduct reliable statistical analyses (also taking into account that about half of the
voters cast a list vote). The same applies to the answer categories (‘often’, ‘sometimes’ and ‘never’) of the
non-voters
* p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.001
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388 In the last three columns of Table 3, we combine the kind of vote and the gender
389 of the candidates voted for. Non-voters do not appear to have a negative bias
390 towards women candidates. They vote signiﬁcantly more for male top candidates
391 (38 versus 26%) and give signiﬁcantly less preference votes for several men (5
392 versus 10%) and for several men and women together (20 versus 28%). It is
393 noticeable that there are no signiﬁcant differences for whether or not to vote for
394 female heads of lists, for one woman and for several women. In sum, the less
395 frequent vote for women is caused by the fact that non-voters do not really ‘choose’
396 candidates, but follow the ﬁgureheads (mostly men) put forward by the party.
397 Now, we move towards the second explanation by analysing whether there are
398 differences in opinion between voters and non-voters concerning women’s political
399 role.
400 The results in Table 4 show that there is almost unanimity that political
401 responsibilities should be shared (statement 1).9 Differences between voters (89%)
402 and non-voters (88%) are small and non-signiﬁcant: the percentage of people that
403 disagree is low, both for voters and for non-voters (3%). This is even the case for
404 people who would never vote. In sum, based on the analysis of the ﬁrst statement,
405 no differences in gender role attitudes between voters and non-voters could be
406 detected.
407 The opinions of voters and non-voters on an equal descriptive representation in
408 parliament (statement 2) do differ signiﬁcantly, but the direction of difference is not
Table 4 Support for a political role for women (row percentages)
(Strongly) agree Agree nor disagree Strongly (disagree)
Women and men should be given equal responsibilities in politics (N = 1621)
Voter/always 89.4 7.6 3.0
Non-voter 88.3 7.7 3.5
v
2
= 0.899 (not signiﬁcant)
Often 89.3 6.7 4.0
Sometimes 90.1 6.6 3.3
Never 87.4 8.8 3.8
v
2
= 2.184 (not signiﬁcant)
It is important that there is an equal number of men and women in parliament (N = 1617)
Voter/always 46.6 24.1 29.3
Non-voter 43.0 30.3 26.7
v
2
= 7.922**
Often 42.7 27.1 30.2
Sometimes 38.5 35.7 25.8
Never 45.0 29.9 25.1
v
2
= 13.606**
* p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.001
9FL01 9 We calculated the Cronbach alpha for a construct underlying both statement 1 and statement 2, but this
9FL02 is rather low with 0.301. Therefore, we treat these two statements separately.
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409 clear. Voters are more in support of this statement than non-voters (46% versus
410 43%), but the opponents of descriptive representation are also more numerous
411 among voters (29%) than among non-voters (26%).
412 In general, some minor differences in how voters and non-voters perceive women
413 in politics appear, but these differences are small and not always unequivocal. This
414 seems to suggest that gender role attitudes could only provide a minor explanation
415 for differences in voting for women between voters and non-voters.
416 This is conﬁrmed if we run a binominal logistic regression with whether or not at
417 least one vote was cast for a woman as dependent variable (see Table 5). We
418 include gender and region (Flanders or Wallonia) as control variables. Over the
419 years, fewer women have been elected in Wallonia than in Flanders (IGVM 2016)
420 and there is a higher proportion of voters casting preference votes only for men in
421 Wallonia than in Flanders (47.9 versus 43.2%) (Andre´ et al. 2010). This could be an
422 indication of a political culture that is less open to women taking up prominent roles
423 in politics.
424 The results of this regression analysis demonstrate that the effect of compulsory
425 voting on voting for women remains signiﬁcant when two variables about gender
426 role attitudes are added (Model 1). The odds of a non-voter casting a vote for
427 women is only 0.654 times the odds of a voter doing so (even when controlling for
428 the effect of gender role attitudes, gender and region). This supports our results
429 discussed above: non-voters vote less for women, but not because they are not
430 convinced of a prominent role for women in politics.
431 In Model 2, we add the three political sophistication variables to the analysis.
432 Political trust is the only of the sophistication variables that has a signiﬁcant
433 effect.10 As expected, the signiﬁcant effect of compulsory voting disappears once
434 we control for political sophistication. This suggests that the effect of compulsory
435 voting is mainly driven by this political sophistication, as we already demonstrated
436 above.
437 In Models 3 and 4, we insert the original variable with four categories (always,
438 often, sometimes, and never) into the analyses. The effects are almost the same
439 (signiﬁcant effect for voting without mandatory voting, which disappears when
440 political sophistication is added to the analysis), but we clearly see that the effect is
441 more outspoken for voters who would never vote if compulsory voting were to be
442 lifted.
443 Conclusion
444 The presence of women in parliaments (and factors inﬂuencing this) has been high
445 on the research agenda for several decades. We focused on the provision of
446 compulsory voting, a speciﬁc institutional variable that has often been overlooked
447 when analysing the effects of electoral rules on women’s representation. While it
10FL01 10 We also ran a logistic regression analysis with an interaction term between gender and the political
10FL02 sophistication variables, but since these interactions were not signiﬁcant, the added value of this analysis
10FL03 is limited. In order to not to confuse the readers, it was left out of this article.
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448 could be argued that compulsory voting is beneﬁcial for the formal representation of
449 socially disadvantaged groups, including women, its effect on the descriptive
450 representation of women remained underexposed. In a cross-country analysis on the
451 macro level, Studlar and McAlister (2002) found a negative effect, but no
452 theoretical explanations were given. It was our aim to search for these explanations
453 and to consider their actual role in inﬂuencing women’s descriptive representation,
454 using data from the 2014 PartiRep Election Study in Belgium.
455 We posit that voters who would no longer vote without compulsory voting are
456 less politically sophisticated, which leads to two possible explanations for the lower
457 number of votes for women.
458 The ﬁrst is that potential non-voters also vote less sophisticatedly (more list and
459 head-of-list voting), which is a disadvantage for women, because often they are less
460 likely than men to be on top of the ballot. Potential non-voters often lack the skills
461 and attitudes needed to cast a sophisticated vote. These expectations are conﬁrmed
462 by our results: non-voters vote signiﬁcantly more for top candidates (who are more
463 likely to be men) and give signiﬁcantly less preference votes to candidates lower
464 down the list (this is especially true for ballots that combine votes for both men and
465 women). The less frequent vote for women by potential non-voters is caused by the
466 fact that these kinds of voters do not really ‘choose’ candidates, but follow the
467 ﬁgureheads (mostly men) put forward by the party.
468 Second, we pointed to differences in voter attitudes about the political role of
469 women. We hypothesised that voters with low levels of political sophistication are
470 less convinced about the political role of women, and precisely these kinds of voters
471 are also more likely to abstain if compulsory voting is lifted. We found, however, no
472 clear evidence for this explanation. Our results demonstrate that the effect of
473 compulsory voting on voting for women runs mainly through the sophistication of
474 the vote, and not so much through the gender ideology of (potential) non-voters. The
475 effect of compulsory voting on voting for women remains signiﬁcant when we
476 control for gender ideology.
477 Our ﬁndings have three further implications.
478 First, there is a clear trade-off between boosting women’s descriptive represen-
479 tation (by abolishing compulsory voting) and keeping women’s formal represen-
480 tation on the current level (by maintaining compulsory voting). We showed that
481 compulsory voting has a negative effect on the descriptive representation of women,
482 while earlier research (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015; Hooghe and Pelleriaux
483 1998; Kittilson 2005) indicated that (without controlling for other effects) women
484 are more likely to abstain if voting was no longer compulsory.
485 Both dimensions of representation have an effect on substantive representation,
486 which is often considered the most important dimension of representation (e.g.
487 Pitkin 1967). Formal representation leads to politicians who, out of electoral
488 concerns, take interests of potential voters into account, but the descriptive
489 representation ensures that champions of women’s interests are present in
490 parliament, which relates to Phillips’ (1995) politics of presence argument. Policy
491 makers, female politicians and women’s interest groups have to consider this trade-
492 off and have to deﬁne their position towards abolishing or maintaining compulsory
493 voting.
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494 Second, it appears again that party selectorates contribute signiﬁcantly to the
495 underrepresentation of women, which refers to the importance of a systemic bias
496 over a voter bias. In their selecting criteria, party selectors are likely to evaluate the
497 qualities of those already present in politics more highly than the qualities of
498 excluded groups (Murray 2014). When the selection of candidates depends heavily
499 on the views and initiatives of party elites, the onus for change lies with them. If
500 party selectors would equally nominate men and women at the top of the lists, no
501 gender effects of compulsory voting would appear, as these effects are mainly
502 driven by voters following the choices of the party elite. Consequently, referring
503 back to the previous point, this would also solve the trade-off between women’s
504 descriptive and formal representation. By boosting women’s descriptive represen-
505 tation, party selectors resolve part of the dilemma and give women’s interest groups
506 the freedom to focus on activities aimed at keeping women’s formal representation
507 at the current level (hence maintaining compulsory voting). The combined effect of
508 these actions is supposed to be beneﬁcial for women’s substantive representation.
509 Finally, by digging deeper into the relationship between compulsory voting and
510 women’s representation and by focusing on the micro level (i.e. voters), we were
511 able to provide a signiﬁcant contribution to the existing literature on electoral
512 systems and the factors that shape women’s representation. The negative effect of
513 compulsory voting on the descriptive representation of women already demon-
514 strated (but not explained) in the cross-country study of Studlar and McAllister
515 (2002) is mainly attributable to the less sophisticated voting behaviour of potential
516 non-voters, and not to their gender role attitudes. It remains to be seen whether this
517 also applies to less complex electoral systems. As such, an important intervening
518 variable of the compulsory voting effect on women’s representation comes to the
519 fore, i.e. the ballot structure of an electoral system. In rather simple electoral
520 systems (majority and plurality systems), where it sufﬁces to mark one candidate
521 out of a limited number of candidates, outsider candidates (including women,
522 perhaps) are more likely to obtain a high number of votes. In complex systems (PR
523 systems with preferential voting, alternative vote), voting for non-incumbents
524 requires much more effort and knowledge. Therefore, in such systems, people who
525 vote only because they are forced to will vote more for established (Crisp et al.
526 2013) candidates (on top of the list). The ballot structure of an electoral system is an
527 important new dimension that could help explain gendered voting effects in
528 compulsory voting systems. We hypothesise in line with Studlar and McAllister
529 (2002) that women candidates will be worse off in elections with compulsory
530 voting, but mainly in electoral systems offering a complex ballot structure
531 (including open and ﬂexible-list PR systems). In addition to Belgium, other
532 countries such as Brazil, Congo, Ecuador and Luxembourg use compulsory voting
533 in combination with a complex ballot structure. We expect to ﬁnd the same bias
534 against women there because of the strong effects of political sophistication. In
535 other countries using majority or plurality systems in combination with compulsory
536 voting (including, for instance, Thailand, Singapore, Gabon, Egypt and many
537 presidential elections in Latin America), we expect to ﬁnd no bonus for incumbent
538 (Crisp et al. 2013) candidates. Future cross-country research should further develop
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539 and test our argument that the gendered effect of compulsory voting is conditional
540 upon the complexity of the electoral system.
541
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